STATE OF MICHIGAN COURT OF APPEALS

In the Matter of In the Matter of LARRY CHARLES WEDDINGTON, JENNIFER SHEENA WEDDINGTON, SARAH MARIE WEDDINGTON, BRITTANY DANIELLE WEDDINGTON, and ANGELA KATIE IDEL WEDDINGTON, Minors.

FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,

Petitioner-Appellee,

V

CHRISTINE VELVET WEDDINGTON, a/k/a CHRISTINE VELVET HAMILTON,

Respondent-Appellant,

and

v

LARRY JOHN WEDDINGTON,

Respondent.

In the Matter of LARRY CHARLES WEDDINGTON, JENNIFER SHEENA WEDDINGTON, SARAH MARIE WEDDINGTON, BRITTANY DANIELLE WEDDINGTON, and ANGELA KATIE IDEL WEDDINGTON, Minors.

FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,

Petitioner-Appellee,

remainer represents,

UNPUBLISHED May 25, 2001

No. 227922 Wayne Circuit Court Family Division LC No. 86-255400

No. 228203

CHRISTINE VELVET WEDDINGTON, a/k/a CHRISTINE VELVET HAMILTON,

Wayne Circuit Court Family Division LC No. 86-255400

Respondent,

and

LARRY JOHN WEDDINGTON,

Respondent-Appellant.

Before: Jansen, P.J., and Zahra and Owens, JJ

MEMORANDUM.

In these consolidated appeals, respondents appeal as of right from the family court order terminating their parental rights to the minor children under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c), ¹ (g) and (j); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(3)(c), (g) and (j). We affirm. This case is being decided without oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).

The family court's findings of fact and conclusions of law comport with MCR 5.974(G), and are sufficient to show that the court was aware of the issues in the case and correctly applied the law, and to enable this Court to conduct appellate review. *People v Armstrong*, 175 Mich App; 437 NW2d 343 (1989); *DeVoe v C A Hull, Inc*, 169 Mich App 569, 576; 426 NW2d 709 (1988). The family court did not clearly err in finding that the statutory grounds for termination were established by clear and convincing evidence. MCR 5.974(I); *In re Miller*, 433 Mich 331, 337; 445 NW2d 161 (1989). Further, the evidence did not show that termination of respondents' parental rights was clearly not in the children's best interests. MCL 712A.19b(5); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(5); *In re Trejo*, 462 Mich 341, 356-357; 612 NW2d 407 (2000). Thus, the family court did not err in terminating respondents' parental rights to the children.

¹ In its written findings of fact and decision, and in reciting those findings and decision on the record, the trial court stated that it was terminating respondents' parental rights pursuant to § 19b(3)(c)(ii). However, the permanent custody petition requested termination under § 19b(3)(c)(i), not subsection (c)(ii). On appeal, both respondents address the court's decision as though the court had actually relied on subsection (c)(i), while petitioner and the minor children address the court's decision as though it was based on subsection (c)(ii), as stated.

² We conclude that, regardless of whether the court intended to terminate under § 19b(3)(c)(i) or § 19b(3)(c)(ii), clear and convincing evidence was presented to support both statutory grounds.

Affirmed.

- /s/ Kathleen Jansen
- /s/ Brian K. Zahra
- /s/ Peter M. Meter